Yersinis Pestic (Plague, Botulism (Bot Pox)), and Staphylococcus Entertoxin B (SEB).

- 2. Chemical warfare agents are detected using M256A1 kits, Drager Colormetric tubes, M8 and M9 paper, photo ionization detectors, and an APD 2000 chemical warfare agent detector. The APD 2000 is the modern version of the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM).
- 3. Nuclear materials are detected by using an AN/PRD-77 Radiac Set. The PDR-77 detects and measures alpha, beta, gamma and x-ray radiation.
- (e) The Base will maintain MOPP Level 4 for 10 percent of the Base military population.

## (5) Command Post Location

- (a) Base: The BOC is located in Bldg 1.
- (b) On-Scene: To be determined.

## 4. Special Installation Areas

- a. <u>Inland Waterway Security</u>. Security of Courthouse Bay is the responsibility of the Courthouse Bay Area Commander, in close cooperation with PMO and the AC/S, ISS, which are responsible for emergency response operations for the entire Base. Upon implementation of THREATCON C, the Supplemental Reaction Force will provide security for inland waterways adjacent to Camp Lejeune, if deemed necessary.
- b. <u>Information Operations</u>. The AC/S, Management Support Department is responsible for safeguarding information and information systems aboard Camp Lejeune.
- c. <u>Buildings</u>. The AC/S, ISS is responsible for coordinating the overall effort of all AC/S principal staff officers, Area Commanders and tenant commanders to ensure that procedures for employment of AT/FP security measures are maintained for each building aboard this installation.

## CHAPTER 4

#### ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

	PARAGRAPH	PAGE
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS	4000	4-3
READINESS AND CONCEPT OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	4001	4-3
MATERIAL AND SERVICES	4002	4-3
UPDATES TO THIS AT/FP PLAN	4003	4-4

#### CHAPTER 4

#### ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### 4000. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

4001. READINESS AND CONCEPT OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. The AC/S, Logistics receives and coordinates all internal and external logistical support requirements from Base, tenant, DoD and non-DoD organizations. All logistical requirements will be forwarded via LOG's Operations Section.

#### 4002. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

- 1. <u>Contracting</u>. Purchases supplies and services not readily available through the supply system.
- 2. <u>DSSC</u>. Stocks and sells consumable supplies, to include: office supplies, petroleum products, paints, lumber, etc., at designated retail issue points.

## 3. Food Services

- a. Manages personnel and resources to prepare and serve meals.
- b. Provides commanders with facilities, subsistence, supplies, and technical advice to manage their mess halls.

#### 4. Motor Transportation

- a. Provides passenger and cargo transportation support to Base and tenant activities.
- b. Provides and maintains garrison mobile equipment (GME), materiel handling equipment (MHE) and engineering equipment to Base and tenant activities.
- 5. <u>Property Control</u>. Provides acquisition, issue, and management support of personnel support equipment (PSE) to include all minor and plant account garrison property.
- 6. TMO. Provides traffic management support to DoD, including personal property, passenger and freight support.

- a. Class VII, End Items. End items are an owning unit's responsibility. Requirements beyond the unit's organic capability will be forwarded to II MEF, via the Logistics Operations Section, for action.
- 4003. UPDATES TO THIS AT/FP INSTALLATION PLAN. This Plan will be reviewed in conjunction with each annual installation AT/FP exercise cycle or as directed by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune.

#### CHAPTER 5

## COMMAND AND SIGNAL

	PARAGRAPH	PAGE
COMMAND AND SIGNAL	5000	5-3
COMMAND	5001	5-3
SIGNAL	5002	5-4

#### CHAPTER 5

#### COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- 5000. <u>COMMAND AND SIGNAL</u>. Specific detailed command relationships and Command and Control (C2) arrangements are situationally dependent, and will be established by the Commanding General, MCB, Camp Lejeune and promulgated via the BOC.
- 1. <u>Situation A, Pre-incident Actions</u>. C2 will normally be exercised through the Area Commanders, who will retain OPCON of those units/assets normally assigned within their areas.

## 2. Situation B, Incident/Post-incident Actions

- a. During condition "normal," C2 will be exercised initially through PMO, with MCB, Camp Lejeune MP and Fire Protection Division assets providing the on-scene commander, and assuming TACON over the vicinity of the crisis site.
  - b. Upon activation of the BOC, C2 will shift to the CCMT.
- 3. <u>Situation C, Incident/Post-incident Actions</u>. During periods of heightened alert, C2 will normally be exercised through the CTMF, via the BOC.

#### 5001. COMMAND

- 1. The Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, exercises command over all forces assigned to the Base during special threat conditions.
- 2. The Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune is designated as Commander of the Crisis Management Team.
- 3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Security and Safety is the Commander, Threat Management Force.
- 4. The Provost Marshal (or designated representative) is the Commander, On-Scene Command Post.
  - a. Command Post is the BOC.

- b. Alternate Command Post will be determined by the Commanding General (or designated representative).
- 5002. <u>SIGNAL</u>. Communications for AT/FP contingency operations will consist of telephone/OMNI-Line, 400 MHz trunked radio, tactical radio, Marine Telecommunications Center (MTCC), Wide/Local Area Network, and runners.

#### APPENDIX A

#### CRITICALITY/VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT LEGEND

- 1. The assessment process for purposes of developing the MEVA Decision Matrix addresses six factors in order to determine an asset's vulnerability:
- a. <u>IMPORTANCE</u>. The importance of an asset is based on its (1) contribution in accomplishing the installation's mission(s), and (2) AT/FP-related function.

CRITERIA	VALUE SCALE
*Essential to mission completion	9-10
*Significant contribution to mission	7-8
*Moderate contribution to mission	5-6
*Minor contribution to mission	3-4
*No significant contribution to mission	1-2

b. <u>IMPACT</u>. The impact of a terrorist attack on an asset has a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological effects. This relates closely to the measure of asset importance.

	CRITERIA	VALUE SCALE
Catastrophic:	Death or permanent disability, system loss, major property damage	9-10
Critical:	Permanent partial disability, major system damage, significant property damage	7-8
Marginal:	Minor injury, minor system damage, minor property damage	5-6
Negligible:	First aid or minor medical treatment, minor system impairment	3-4
No substantive	effect	1-2

c. <u>RECOVERABILITY</u>. An asset's recoverability is measured by the estimated time required to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the asset.

CRITERIA	VALUE SCALE
-Replacement, repair, or substitution requires: 1 month or more	9-10
-Replacement, repair, or substitution requires: 1 week to 1 month	7-8
-Replacement, repair, or substitution requires: 72 hours to 1 week	5-6
-Replacement, repair, or substitution requires: 24 hours to 72 hours	3-4
-Same day replacement, repair, or substitution	1-2

d. <u>VULNERABILITY</u>. An asset is vulnerable if it is not protected against terrorism capabilities. When assessing the vulnerability of an asset, consider: (1) the nature and construction of the asset; (2) the amount of damage required to disable or destroy the asset; and (3) the capabilities and intentions of the terrorists identified in the local area Threat Assessment, which can be obtained through NCIS.

CRITERIA	VALUE SCALE
-Extremely vulnerable to the identified terrorists' capabilities	9-10
-Significantly vulnerable to the identified terrorists' capabilities	7-8
-Moderately vulnerable to the identified terrorists' capabilities	5-6
-Somewhat vulnerable to the identified terrorists' capabilities	3-4
-Not vulnerable to the identified terrorists' capabilities	1-2

e. ACCESSIBILITY. An asset's accessibility is the degree to which it can be reached by terrorist actions. Accessibility is measured in terms of relative ease or difficulty of movement for the terrorist element and the likelihood of detection. When addressing accessibility, refer to the Threat Assessment for information on terrorist capabilities.

CRITERIA	VALUE SCALE
-Easily accessible	9-10
-Fairly accessible 4	7-8
-Moderately accessible	5-6
-Somewhat accessible	3-4
-Not accessible or inaccessible without extreme difficulty	1-2

f. <u>RECOGNIZABILITY</u>. An asset's recognizability is the degree to which a terrorist can identify an asset and its relative importance to the installation.

CRITERIA	VALUE SCORE
-The asset's function requires little or no knowledge for recognition.	9-10
-The asset's function requires a small amount of knowledge for recognition.	7-8
-The asset's function requires some knowledge for recognition.	5-6
-The asset's function is easily confused with other targets or components and requires extensive knowledge for recognition.	3-4
-The asset's function cannot be recognized under any condition, except by experts.	1-2

# Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA) Identification Matrix

	<u> </u>	T	Recover-	Vulner-	Access-	Recogniz-	T
Assets	Importance	Impact	ability	ability	ibility	ibility	TOTAL
Bldg 1	10	9	7	9	10	10	55
Bldg 2	10	9	7	9	10	10	55
Bldg 3	10	10	8	8	10	10	56
Bldg 12	10	10	10	10	10	10	60
Bldg 15	Renovation						<del>                                     </del>
Bldg 18	9	8	6	6	8	5	42
Bldg 20	8	10	8	10	10	10	56
Bldg 40	4	10	10	10	10	10	54
Bldg 43	8	8	8	5	7	8	44
Bldg 84	2	10	10	10	10	10	52
Bldg 89	1	4	6	6	10	10	37
Bldg 103	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 126	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 131	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 132	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 145	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 218	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 230	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 231	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 257	2	2	5	8	10	10	37
Bldg 303	8	7	7	7	2	7	38
Bldg 328	8	7	7	7	2	<del>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </del>	38
Bldg 353	8	8	7	8	2	9	42
Bldg 405	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 413	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 418	8	7	9	7	2	<del>                                     </del>	30
Bldg 425	1	9	4	9	10	10	43
Bldg 428	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 504	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 505	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 513	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 564	2	2	5	8	10	10	37
Bldg 575	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 631	5	10	8	10	9	10	52
Bldg 670	9	10	10	8	8	10	55
Bldg 730	2	7	3	10	10	8	40
Bldg 751	2	7	3	10	10	10	42
Bldg 820	4	3	3	8	10	10	38
Bldg 825	4	10	10	10	10	10	54
Bldg 835	4	10	10	10	10	10	54
Bldg 842	3	7	2	9	10		41
Bldg 896-898	4	10	10	10	10	10	54
Bldg 989	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 1057	2	2	4	10	10	10	38
Bldg 1101	Vacated	-	*	10	10	10	38
Bldg 1117	Vacated 8	7	9	7	2	7	1 20
Bldg 1220	1	2	1				30
Bldg 1230	4		<del></del>	10	10	10	34
Bldg 1231	4	8	10	10	10	10	52 52
Bldg 1400	8	7	8	10	10	10	4
Prad 1400		<u> </u>	1 8	10	10	10	53

#### Identification Matrix

		T	Recover-	Vulner-	Access-	Recogniz-	
Assets	Importance	Impact	ability	ability	ibility	ibility	TOTAL
Bldg 1515	1	1	1	10	10	10	33
Bldg 1613	4	5	5	10	10	10	44
Bldg 1855	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg 1943	4	10	10	10	10	10	54
Bldg 1985	2	10	7	10	9	10	48
Bldg 2600	8	7	8	10	10	10	53
Bldg 2615	2	10	6	10	8	10	46
Bldg 5400	4	10	10	10	10	10	54
Bldg M-177	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg M-303	8	7	8	10	10	10	53
Bldg BA-117	2	2	2	10	10	10	36
Bldg BA-119	2	8	9	10	10	5	44
Bldg BB-6	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg BB-255	9	8	2	6	5	8	38
Bldg BB-49	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg FC-301/302	10	8	8	7	5	7	45
Bldg FC-301/302	8	7	9	7	2	<del> </del>	30
	2	5	5	10	10	10	42
Bldg FC-424 Bldg FC-364	10	9	9	4	3	7	42
	2	2	2	10	10	10	36
Bldg LCH-4034	4	4	7	10	10	10	45
Bldg PT-5	8	7	8	10	10	10	53
Bldg RR-6		<del>  '</del>	10	10	9	6	47
Bldg RR-11	5			5	3	10	48
ASP Compound	10	10	10	6	$\frac{3}{7}$	5	46
Bldg SH-8	10	9 2	2				36
Bldg TFM-125	2			10	10	10	
Bldg TT-19	2	9	8	10	4		41
Bldg TT-48	4	10	10		3	10	
Bldg TT-60	4	10	10	7	3	10	44
Bldg TT-91	4	10	10	7	3	10	44
Bldg TT-2478	2	2	2	10	10	10	36
Bldg TC-701	8	7	8	7	3	10	43
Bldg G-480	9	8	10	10	10	8	55
Bldg's SRR-18,	5	5	6	7	5	6	34
23, & 25	ļ	5	6	7	5	6	34
Bldg SRR-21	5	5	6	<del>  '</del> 7	5	6	34
Bldg's SBB-154,	3	) 3	•	1 '	3	8	34
158, 159	8	7	9	7	2	7	30
Bldg S-415	10	10	10	10	10	7	57
Bldg NH-100	10	10	10	10	8	9	57
Bldg H-1	10	9	10	10	8	9	56
Bldg H-23	10	9	10	10	8	9	56
Bldg H-17		9		10	8	9	56
Bldg H-32	10	10	10	10	4	10	54
Base Housing Area							
Gen Officers Qtrs		10	5	8	10	10	53 48
Perimeter Gates	10	7	1 =	10		10	55
BEQ/BOQ Areas	10	10	5	10	10	10	60
Industrial Area	10	10	10	10	10	10	1 60

Note: Assets with the total value between 40 and 60 are designated as probable MEVA's. Assets whose total assessment value is between 20 and 39 should not be disregarded completely.

## Mission Essential/Vulnerable Area

## Decision Matrix

Bldg	Unit	Description	ME	VA	Restricted Area
1	MCB Hq	VIP, CMS, BOC	x	x	Level I
2	FSSG Hq	VIP, Comm Center	x	x	No
		Security Force,			
3	PMO, MCB	RFI Wpns Storage	x	x	Level II
15	Dispensary, MCB	Medical		x	No
		Emergency Consolidated			
18	Fire Protection Div Hq	Dispatch, Fire Station	х	x	No
20	Water Trmt Fac	Contains Chlorine Tks	Х	x	No
40	Russell Elem Scol	Children Family Mbrs		x	No
43	PMO SRT/Motor Trans	Emergency Response	х	х	Level II
84	MCCS	Exch Annex, Wpns Sales		x	No
89	MCCS	Bowling Alley		х	No
103	2d CEB, 2d MARDIV	Armory	x	<u> </u>	Level II
126	8 <sup>th</sup> Mar Regt	Armory	х	+	Level II
131	2d Bn, 8th Mar	Armory	х	1	Level II
132	3d Bn, 8th Mar	Armory	Х	+	Level II
145	2d MARDIV Armory	Empty as of 1-99		1	N/A
218	3d Bn, 10 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Armory	х		Level III
230	3d Bn, 2d Mar	Armory	x	1	Level II
231	2d Bn, 2d Mar	Armory	x	1	Level II
257	MCCS	Area 1-2 Snack Bar		х	No
303	6 <sup>th</sup> Mar Regt	Armory	х	<b>+</b>	Level II
328	HQBn, 2d MARDIV	Armory	х		Level III
353	Generator Bldg	Power Supply	x	-	No
405	5 <sup>th</sup> Bn, 10 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Armory	x		Level II
413	3d Bn, 10 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Armory	х	1	Level II
418	6 <sup>th</sup> Mar Regt	Armory	x	-	Level II
425	MCCS	SNCO Club		x	No
428	2d Bn, 6 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Armory	х	1	Level II
504	H&S Bn, 2d FSSG	Armory	х		Level I
505	3d Bn, 10 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Armory	Х	1	Level II
513	10 <sup>th</sup> Mar Regt	Armory	х	+	Level II
525	1st Bn, 10th Mar	Armory	х		Level III
564	MCCS	Area 4-5 Snack Bar		X	No
575	2d LAR Bn, 2d MARDIV	Armory	х		Level II
631	Brewster Child Dev Ctr	Children Family Mbrs	1	x	No
670	Water Trmt Fac	Contains Chlorine Tks	x	X	No
730	MCCS	Marston Pavilion		X	No
751	MCCS	Goettge Field House	<del> </del>	x	No
	Berkeley Manor Gas		<b>†</b>	<del></del>	
820	Station/C-Store	Explosive Fuel		x	No
825	Brewster Mid Scol	Children Family Mbrs		X	No
835	Lejeune High Scol	Children Family Mbrs		x	No

#### Decision Matrix

Bldg	Unit	Description	ME	VA	Restricted Area
842	MCCS	Stone St Youth Center		x	No
896-898	MCCS	Hostess House		х	No
989	2d Sup Bn, 2d FSSG	Armory	Х		No
		Industrial Area Snack			_
1057	MCCS	Bar/C-Store		x	No
· LLI IV. PARKATANA		Comm Ctr, Data Proc Ctr,			
1101	MCB	MIMMS Office	x	x	No
1117	HqSptBn, MCB	Armory	x		Level II
1202	MCCS	Industrial Area Snack Bar		X	No
1220	Burger King			x	No
1230	DeCA Commissary a			X	No
1231	MCCS	Main Exchange		х	No
1400	Fire Protection Div	Fire Station	х	x	No
1515	Dominos Pizza			х	No
1613	MCCS	Base Gas Station	<del>                                     </del>	x	No
1855	2d Tank Bn	Armory	x	+	Level II
1943	Stone St Elem Scol	Children Family Mbrs		x	No
1985	MCCS	CamLej Youth Center	+	х	No
2600	Fire Protection Div	Fire Station	x	x	No
2615	MCCS	Officers' Club		x	No
<del></del>	Berkeley Manor Elem		+	- <del> </del>	
5400	Scol	Children Family Mbrs		$\mathbf{x}$	No
M-177	MCCSSS, FMSS	Armory	x	<del> </del>	Level II
M-303	Fire Protection Div	Fire Station	X	x	No
BA-117	MCCS	Onslow Beach C-Store		X	No
BA-119	Generals Beach House	VIP		x	No
BB-6	2d AAV Bn, 2d MARDIV	Armory	x	+	Level II
	Area Guard/	Security Personnel/	+	<del> </del>	
BB-255	RFI Arms Storage	Weapons	x	x	No
BB-49	MCES, MCB	Armory	X	<del> </del>	Level II
BB-245	MCCS	Courthouse Bay C-Store		x	No
D-700	MCCS	Knox Trailer Park C-Store		x	No
FC-301/	Consolidated Armory			+	
302	Compound	Armory	x		Level II
FC-286	2d Maint Bn, 2d FSSG	Weapons Repair - Armory	X	x	Level II
		French Creek C-Store/			Devel 11
FC-425	MCCS	Snack Bar		x	No
FC-364	2d Radio Bn, 2d SRIG	SCIF	x	X	Level III
		Midway Park Gas Station/	1	1	TGAGT TIT
LCH-4034	MCCS	C-Store		x	No
PT-5	MARS Station	Comm Facility	x	X	No
RR-6		Turney Turney	1	1	110
StoneBay	Fire Protection Div	Fire Station	x	x	No
RR-11	Wpns Trng Bn, MCB	·	X		
ASP	Apris IIIIg Bil, MCB	Armory		+	Level I
	2d Sup Bn 2d Essa	Munitions Stores		v	T 1 T
Compound	2d Sup Bn, 2d FSSG	Munitions Storage	x	X	Level I

#### Decision Matrix

					Restricted
Bldg	Unit	Description	ME	VA	Area
SH-8	2d Sup Bn, 2d FSSG	ASP Area Guard, RFI Wpns	Х	X	No
TFM-125	MCCS	Camp Devil Dog C-Store		X	No
TT-19	MCCS	TT Youth Center		X	No
TT-48	TT II Elem School	Children Family Members		X	No
TT-60	TT I Elem School	Children Family Members		x	No
TT-91	TT Child Develop Ctr	Children Family Members		X	No
TT-2478	MCCS	TT Gas Station/C-Store		X	No
TC-701	Fire Protection Div	Fire Station		x	No
G-480	SOI, MCB	Armory	х		Level II
SRR-18					
23, 25	Wpns Trng Bn, MCB	Ammunition Storage		x	Level I
SRR-21	SOTG, II MEF	Ammunition Storage	X		No
SBB-154,					
158, 159	MCES, MCB	Munitions Storage	x	X	Level II
S-415	II MACE	Armory		x	Level II
NH-100	U.S. NavHosp, MCB	Hospital	x	X	Level I,III
H-1	HQ, II MEF & 2d MARDIV	VIP, LWTC, CMS	X	x	No
H-23	MEU HQ	CMS	x		No
H-17	MCMO	CMS		x	Level III
H-32	NCIS, MCB	Security Personnel	Х	X	No
Base Hsg		Residential At-risk			
Areas	MCB	Populace		X	No
GenO Hqs		VIP		x	No
Perimeter		Security Personnel			
Gates	PMO, MCB	Controlled Ingress/Egress	x	x	No
BEQ/BOQ					
Areas				x	No
Industrial					
Area		Fuel Farms/stations	x	x	No

#### APPENDIX B

#### THREAT LEVELS, THREATCONS, AND THREATCON MEASURES

#### 1. THREAT LEVELS

- a. There are two main types of warnings of terrorist activity: Threat Levels and Threat Conditions. Threat Levels are obtained based on the presence of a combination of the factors listed below.
- b. DoD has developed a methodology to assess the terrorist threat to DoD personnel, facilities, equipment, and interests. There are six factors used in shaping the collection and analysis of information: Existence, Capability, Intentions, History, Targeting, and Security Environment.
- c. Issuing a terrorist threat-level judgment is not a warning notice. Formal terrorism warning notices are issued separately. Based on analysis of information in the categories listed above, a Threat Level using one of the following five terms will be set:
  - (1) CRITICAL
  - (2) HIGH
  - (3) MEDIUM
  - (4) LOW
  - (5) NEGLIGIBLE
- d. Terrorist Threat Levels are provided by the intelligence community and are advisory in nature. Threat Condition warnings, or THREATCON's, are the principal means a commander has to apply an operational decision on how to guard against the threat.
- 2. TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION SYSTEM (THREATCON's)

#### a. Purpose

(1) The THREATCON system describes the progressive level of protective measures implemented in response to terrorist

threats in accordance with references (b), (c), and (f). The THREATCON set by higher headquarters represents a baseline to which the installation commander must adhere. Assessed threat levels do not dictate the specific THREATCON posture that the installation assumes. The installation commander will declare a THREATCON Level appropriate for his/her location.

CONDITION	DESCRIPTION	MEASURES
NORMAL	Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.	
ALPHA	Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and installations, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable. Circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures; however, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from higher THREATCON's. The measures in THREATCON ALPHA must me capable of being maintained indefinitely.	1-10
BRAVO	Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relationships with local authorities.	1-29
CHARLIE	Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and installations is imminent. Implementation of this THREATCON for more than a short period will most likely create hardship, and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.	11-39

CONDITION	DESCRIPTION	MEASURES
DELTA	Applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, THREATCON DELTA is declared as a localized warning.	11-50

#### THREATCON ALPHA

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
MEASURE 1. At regular intervals, remind all	* Disseminate THREATCON information.
personnel and family members to be suspicious	CPAO will draft a public announcement appropriate to THREATCON.
and inquisitive about	PMO will conduct Crime Prevention
strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases	<pre>brief, as appropriate.   ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders will</pre>
and other containers.	institute proper information flow.
Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of U.S. install-	* Receive THREATCON feedback.
ations. Watch for	ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders ensure
abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual	suspicious information is reported to appropriate authorities.
activity.	
MEASURE 2. Duty officer and personnel having	* Personnel Availability/Capability
access to building plans	Check/Update Recall Rosters.
will have them available at all times for area	Inform key personnel, as appropriate Familiarize key personnel with
evacuations. Key personnel required to implement	security and evacuation responsibilities.
security plans should be on call and readily avail-	* Building/Evacuation Plans
able and able to seal off	Ensure building plans are available,
an area immediately.	as required Familiarize staff with evacuation
	procedures.
MEASURE 3. Secure	* Identify areas as "in use" or "not in
buildings, rooms, and	use," as appropriate.
storage areas not in regular use.	* Secure "not in use" areas.
MEASURE 4. Increase	* PMO
security spot checks of	
vehicles and persons entering the installation	Increase random vehicle checks (consider mobile checks).
and of unclassified areas	Institute ID spot checks at Gates.
under U.S. jurisdiction.	Prepare for surge ops at Vehicle Registration.
	veatering.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
ALPHA <u>MEASURE 4</u> (continued)	* Area/Tenant Commanders  Ensure POV's are properly registered.  Ensure personnel have ID Cards.
MEASURE 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.	* PMO  Monitor traffic flow Institute control measures as appropriate Identify alternate traffic routes.  * Area/Tenant Commanders Initiate traffic personnel control points as necessary.
MEASURE 6. As a deterrent, apply MEASURES 14, 15, 17, or 18 from THREATCON BRAVO individually or in a combination.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Institute command responsibilities for Measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 accordingly.
MEASURE 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the introduction of higher THREATCON's.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders Review and update as necessary.
MEASURE 8. Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel, as appropriate.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Identify high-risk personnel.  * PMO  Institute protective details as appropriate.  Coordinate with visiting dignitaries to determine security coordination as needed.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
ALPHA MEASURE 8 (continued)	* Protocol  Provide listing to PMO of all visiting dignitaries.
MEASURE 9. Spare.	Spare
MEASURE 10. Repeat MEASURE 1 and warn personnel of any other potential form of terrorist attack.	* See Measure 1.

#### THREATCON BRAVO

MEASURE 11. Keep all personnel on call who are involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Place key personnel in stand-by status.  Be prepared to recall key personnel within 60 minutes.
MEASURE 12. Check plans for implementation of the next THREATCON.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Assess preparation/plans for implementation of THREATCON CHARLIE.
MEASURE 13. Move cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers), at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider centralized parking.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Remove vehicles from within 25 meters of all MEVA locations.  * PMO  Conduct spot checks of MEVA locations to ensure compliance.  * Area/Tenant Commanders  Ensure security teams, Area Guard monitors are in compliance within area of responsibilities.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
MEASURE 14. Secure and frequently inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Conduct inspections of areas identified as 'not in use' to ensure compliance with Measure 3.
MEASURE 15. At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in use for suspicious packages.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Ensure compliance with regard to all areas identified as ''in use'' under MEASURE 3.
MEASURE 16. Examine mail (above the regular examination process) for letter or parcel bombs.	* Base Postal Institute explosive inspections as appropriate Institute liaison with PMO for Explosive Detection Dog Support Initiate liaison with EOD.
	* PMO Ensure availability of Explosive Detection Dogs Initiate direct liaison with EOD.  * EOD Establish direct liaison with Base Postal and PMO Ensure immediate availability of EOD personnel Consider additional coordination as required.
MEASURE 17. Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. Advise family members to check home deliveries.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Establish and implement procedures for checking deliveries.  Report all abnormalities and suspicious activity to appropriate authorities

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
* Area/Tenant Commanders
Establish spot check procedures to ensure compliance.
* CPAO
Prepare to publicize through all internal and external outlets
* Area Commanders
Institute overt surveillance of
barracks, dining facilities, clubs, and
other soft targets.
other sort targets.
+ 7340
* PMO
Implement random covert
surveillance/counter-surveillance
operations as appropriate.
Establish contact/liaison with other
federal and military agencies for purpose of expanding surveillance operations if required.
* CPAO
Assume lead agency role in
information process.
* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
Disseminate appropriate level
THREATCON information to staff and
personnel in cooperation with CPAO.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSILITIES
BRAVO MEASURE 20. At an early stage, inform members of	* AC/S, ISS
local security committees of action being taken. Explain reasons for actions.	Assemble representative of all ACs/S, Area and Tenant Commanders to inform them of actions taken and reasons Instruct them to inform subordinate organization and activities accordingly.
MEASURE 21. Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Implement inspections of visitors and random inspections of parcels and containers.
MEASURE 22. Operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.	* Area/Tenant Commanders  Institute random patrols accordingly, utilizing Area Guard and security personnel.  * PMO  Institute additional patrols to ensure compliance.
MEASURE 23. Protect off-Base personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering or driving.	* CPAO  Inform public through television, radio, and print media of appropriate safeguards.  * ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Conduct organizational-level safety stand-downs regarding AT/FP concerns/terrorism awareness.
MEASURE 24. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.	* PMO  Attain current Threat Assessment.  Implement additional security measures accordingly.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
BRAVO  MEASURE 25. Brief personnel who may augment guard forces on the use of deadly	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Identify personnel as required.  Brief accordingly.
force.	
MEASURE 26-29 Spares	Spares

#### THREATCON CHARLIE

	A A A A STATE OF THE
MEASURE 30. Continue or introduce all measures listed in THREATCON BRAVO.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Continue or introduce all measures listed in THREATCON BRAVO accordingly.
MEASURE 31. Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans at their place of duty.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Recall to place of duty personnel identified in Measure 11.
MEASURE 32. Limit access points to absolute minimum.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Reduce the number of access points to the absolute minimum required for mission accomplishment.
MEASURE 33. Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles.	* PMO  Gates  Restrict access to only those absolutely necessary (i.e., personnel (civilian and military) working on Base, bona fide contract personnel, deliveries, and family members residing aboard Base, etc.)  Institute random vehicle searches, including delivery vehicles.  Institute roving spot checks and vehicle searches.  * ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Identify all civilian personnel and contract companies authorized access.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
CHARLIE MEASURE 33 (continued)	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders (cont)
·	Call those personnel and contractors not absolutely necessary and instruct them to reschedule Encourage carpooling to reduce vehicle volume Schedule to accommodate delays at Gate.
	*CPAO
4	Inform public of THREATCON CHARLIE Advise retirees/off-Base family members seeking medical assistance to make maximum use of Tricare services.
	* NavHosp
	Be prepared for surge in Tricare services relating to implementation of this measure.
MEASURE 34. Enforce centralized vehicle	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
parking away from sensitive buildings.	Identify centralized parking areas Report centralized parking locations to the Base Operations Center (BOC) Regularly patrol parking area.
	* PMO
	Randomly spot check central parking areas to ensure compliance.
	Identify centralized parking areas Report centralized parking locations to the Base Operations Center (BOC) Regularly patrol parking area.
	* PMO
	Randomly spot check central parking areas to ensure compliance.
MEASURE 35. Issue weapons to guards.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
meapons to guarus.	Issue weapons and ammunition to all

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
CHARLIE	
MEASURE 35 (continued)	Personnel performing security functions.
Local order should	
include specific orders	
on issuing ammunition.	
MEASURE 36. Increase patrols of the installation.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Increase patrols.  Increase frequency of random checks/ searches.
q	* MCAS New River
	Provide two rotary wing aircraft on a 24-hour-a-day basis for BOC personnel use.
	* II MEF
	Provide HMMWV support to authorized BOC representatives as needed.
	* PMO
	Increase perimeter patrols.
MEASURE 37. Protect all designated	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
vulnerable points.	Deploy protective barriers.
give special attention	Execute enhanced physical security
to vulnerable points	measures as necessary.
outside the military establishment.	* AC/S, Facilities
	Issue/deliver barrier materials as appropriate.
MEASURE 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.	* AC/S, Facilities
	Provide barriers to gates and other locations as required.
	* AC/S, ISS
	Initiate barrier controls at appropriate locations.
MEASURE 39. Spare.	Spare

## THREATCON MEASURES COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

#### THREATCON DELTA

	<u></u>
MEASURE 40. Continue or introduce all	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
measures listed for THREATCON's BRAVO and	Introduce "responsibilities" listed for THREATCON's BRAVE and CHARLIE
CHARLIE.	accordingly.
MEASURE 41. Augment quards as necessary.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
ę	Report to the BOC requirements for additional guard personnel.
	Be prepared to provide BOC's requirements for additional guard
	personnel.
MEASURE 42. Identify all vehicles or	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
mission support areas.	Identify vehicles as required Ensure guard/security personnel are
	briefed on authorized vehicles.
	* PMO
	Institute spot check to ensure compliance.
	Prepare for surge for vehicle registration/record checks.
	registration/record checks.
MEASURE 43. Search	* PMO
contents before allow- ing entrance to the	Institute 100% vehicle searches at gates.
installation.	Notify cooperating federal and military agencies of requirement.
	Coordinate with the NC State Highway
	Patrol, Jacksonville Police Department and Onslow County Sheriff's Office, as apt.
	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders
	Instruct civilian and military
	personnel and contractors to keep traffic
	into the Installation to an absolute minimum.
	* CPAO
	Notify the public accordingly.

THREATCON MEASURES	COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
MEASURE 44. Control access and implement positive identification of all personnel.	* PMO  Continue 100% ID checks at gates.  * ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders  Institute 100% ID checks at all MEVA's.  Establish access rosters to all MEVA's.  Restrict access to MEVA's to mission- essential personnel only.
MEASURE 45. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought onto the installation.	* PMO Institute searches at installation gates.
MEASURE 46. Control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.	* PMO  Contact the NC State Highway Patrol and the Onslow County Sheriff's Office to request increased patrols and spot checks on Highways 24, 17, 210, and 172.  Contact the Jacksonville Police Department to request increased patrols and spot checks on Highway 24.
MEASURE 47. Frequent checks of building exteriors and parking areas.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders Institute checks accordingly.
MEASURE 48. Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.	* ACs/S, Area/Tenant Commanders Minimize journeys and visits accordingly.
MEASURE 49. Coordinate the possible closing of public and military roads and facilities with local authorities.  MEASURE 50. Spare.	* PMO  Contact local law enforcement authorities. Institute actions as appropriate.  Spare


#### APPENDIX C

#### NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

1. General. Command notification is vital to the proper and timely dissemination of information to those bearing ultimate responsibility for accurate handling and reporting of AT/FP-related incidents and activities impacting Camp Lejeune. This appendix describes the notification procedures to be followed in the event of a terrorist incident.

#### 2. Responsibilities

- a. During Normal Duty Hours
- (1) Notification Flow Chart <u>beginning with person</u> receiving information:



#### Flow Chart (continued)

C/S, MCB, CamLej will notify	AC/S, TE&O, MCB, will notify	Dir, O&P Div (BOC) will notify
CG, MCB, CamLej	AC/S, MANP	French Creek
451-2526	451-2220	AComdr, 451-1810
CG, II MEF	Dir, CPAO	Court House Bay
451-8950	451-2751	AComdr, 450-7136
CG, 2d MARDIV	AC/S, LOG	Camp Johnson
451-8000	451-2934	AComdr, 450-0912
CG, 2d FSSG	AC/S, FAC	Camp Geiger
451-5504	451-3034	AComdr, 450-0179
	AC/S, COMPT 451-2427	Stone Bay AComdr, 450-2916
	SJA 451-5502	CO, NavHosp 450-4007
	AC/S, MCCS 451-2525	CO, HqSptBn, MCB 451-5403

#### b. During Non-Duty Hours:

- (1) The person in receipt of initial information will notify the Consolidated Dispatch Center (911).
- (2) The Consolidated Dispatch Center will notify the MP Desk Sergeant (451-2555).
- (3) The MP Desk Sergeant will notify the Military Police Desk Sergeant and the MCB Command Duty Officer at 451-2414.
- (4) The MP Duty Watch Commander will notify the Provost Marshal and the PMO Operations Officer and will initiate an MP recall.

- (5) The <u>Provost Marshal</u> will notify the AC/S, Installation Security and Safety.
- (6) The AC/S, Installation Security and Safety will notify the Chief of Staff, MCB, CamLej, who will in turn notify the CG, MCB, CamLej and request implementation of this Plan.
- (7) The Base Command Duty Officer will notify the AC/S, TE&O, who will activate the BOC, if required. If the BOC is activated, the AC/S, TE&O will notify:
  - (a) AC/S, Manpower
  - (b) Dir, CPAO
  - (c) AC/S, Logistics
  - (d) AC/S, Facilities
  - (e) AC/S, Comptroller
  - (f) Staff Judge Advocate
  - (g) AC/S, MCCS
  - (8) II MEF Command Duty Officer, 451-8149.
  - (9) 2d MARDIV Command Duty Officer, 451-8319.
  - (10) 2d FSSG Command Duty Officer, 451-2826.
- c. The Chief of Staff, MCB, CamLej will promulgate a FROST CALL to alert all activities aboard Camp Lejeune of the establishment of a THREATCON.

#### APPENDIX D

#### INSTALLATION AT/FP EXERCISES

- 1. <u>General</u>. Appendix D outlines the general planning sequence for the conduct of installation AT/FP exercises.
- 2. Responsibilities. Installation AT/FP exercises are the responsibility of the AC/S, ISS, in close cooperation with the AC/S, TE&O and NCIS. The AC/S, ISS's responsibilities can be divided as follows:
- a. Organizes an AT/FP working group to provide initial evaluation of the current AT/FP Plan in light of current threat circumstances and any changes that may have occurred since the last AT/FP Plan review.
- b. Identifies an installation AT/FP project officer whose major additional duty for the duration of the AT/FP exercise cycle is successful completion of the AT/FP exercise cycle.
- c. Issues a coordinating draft of the AT/FP Plan for review by installation command, staff, and tenant organizations.
- d. Conducts the installation level exercise, which, at a minimum, will include activation of the BOC/CMT. The exercise will also include a minimum of three parts:
  - (1) An AT/FP Plan review/instruction period.
  - (2) An active exercise period.
  - (3) An after-action review period.

The actual time allotted for the conduct of each exercise will vary dependent upon installation priorities.

3. AT/FP Exercise Concept. The annual AT/FP exercise, which will include all four THREATCON's, will be designed to test the AT/FP Plan in order to identify shortfalls and weaknesses. Special attention will be given to implementing security measures under THREATCON's CHARLIE and DELTA. Crisis and consequence management aspects of AT/FP procedures will also be included.

- 4. Exercise Cycle. The annual AT/FP exercise cycle will last approximately four months: three months planning the exercise (E-90) and one month after-action review and AT/FP Plan revision (E+30). The period will generally be announced in the August/September timeframe, before the new Fiscal Year. The planning sequence for the annual AT/FP exercise follows ("E" refers to "Exercise Day."):
- a.  $\underline{E-90}$ . AC/S, ISS announces formation of the annual AT/FP working group. Membership will include representatives from TE&O, TE&O, and NCIS at a minimum. Initially, meetings will be held to review the current Plan based on current threat information and any changes that may have occurred on Base or in the region. At first, the AT/FP Plan will be staffed among the staff organizations present at this meeting.
- b.  $\underline{E-75}$ . The deadline for the AT/FP working group to complete an internal review of current AT/FP Plan. AT/FP working group consolidates input and draws up a coordinating draft of AT/FP Plan.
- c. E-70. Upon completion of the coordinating draft of the AT/FP Plan, it is staffed to MCB, Camp Lejeune, command, staff, and tenant organizations for review.
  - d. E-55. Review deadline.
- e. <u>E-45</u>. AT/FP working group completes revision of AT/FP Plan based upon command, staff and tenant organizational input and develops concept for annual AT/FP exercise. Revised AT/FP Plan and exercise concept is submitted to the AC/S, ISS for review.
- f.  $\underline{E-40}$ . AC/S, ISS approves revised AT/FP Plan concept, and directs AT/FP working group to draw up LOI for annual AT/FP exercise.
- g. E-30. AT/FP working group draws up LOI, which is then forwarded to the AC/S, ISS for approval.
- h. E-25. AC/S, ISS approves LOI, which is forwarded to C/S, MCB, CamLej for approval.
- i.  $\underline{E-21}$ . C/S, MCB Camp Lejeune, approves AT/FP exercise concept.

- j. E-14. AT/FP LOI is published.
- k. "E DAY." Exercise Day.
- 1.  $\underline{E+1}$ . Draft After-Action Review for staff evaluation is completed.
  - m. E+7. Deadline for return of draft After-Action Review.
- n. <u>E+10</u>. After-Action Review completed. Following CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, approval, review is submitted to Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC)/Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).
- o. <u>E+20</u>. AT/FP working group integrates After-Action Review comments into revised AT/FP Plan, as appropriate. Post-exercise Plan is forwarded to the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, for approval.
- p.  $\underline{E+30}$ . Upon approval by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, the post exercise Plan is published as new AT/FP Plan.

Note: Nothing in this Appendix should be construed to discourage AT/FP exercises longer than one day's duration.

#### APPENDIX E

#### GLOSSARY/ACRONYMS

#### **GLOSSARY**

Antiterrorism (AT). Defensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts to include limited response and containment by local military forces.

Combating Terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counter-terrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.

<u>Counter-terrorism</u>. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

<u>Deterrence</u>. The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.

<u>High-risk Personnel</u>. U.S. personnel and their family members whose grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make them especially attractive or accessible terrorist targets.

Incident Control Point. A designated point close to a terrorist incident where crisis management forces will rendezvous and establish control capability before initiating a tactical reaction.

Initial Response Force. The first unit, usually Military Police, on the scene of a terrorist incident.

<u>Installation</u>. A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which supports particular functions. Installations may be elements of a Base.

Installation Commander. The individual responsible for all installation operations.

<u>Negotiations</u>. A discussion between authorities and a barricaded offender or terrorist to effect hostage release and terrorist surrender.

Open Source Information. Information of potential intelligence value (i.e., intelligence data) that is available to the general public.

Operations Center. The facility or location on an installation, base, or facility used by the commander to command, control, and coordinate all crisis activities.

Operations Security (OPSEC). A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to operations and other activities to:

- a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
- c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Physical Security. That part of security dealing with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

<u>Prevention</u>. The security procedures undertaken by the public and private sector in order to discourage terrorist acts.

<u>Proactive</u>. Measures taken in the preventive stage of antiterrorism designed to harden targets and detect actions before they occur.

<u>Signal Security</u>. A generic term that includes both communications security and electronic security.

Tactical Security. In operations, the measures necessary to deny information to the enemy and to ensure that a force retains its freedom of action and is warned or protected against an unexpected encounter with the enemy or an attack.

Terrorism. The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear. Terrorism is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Terrorist. An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.

Terrorist Groups. Any element regardless of size or espoused cause, which repeatedly commits acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of its political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Threat Analysis. In antiterrorism, threat analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups that could target a facility. A threat analysis will review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment.

Threat and Vulnerability Assessment. In antiterrorism, the pairing of a facility's threat analysis and vulnerability analysis.

#### ACRONYMS

2d FSSG 2d Force Service Support Group
2d FSSG 2d Force Dervise Support Sear 2d MARDIV 2d Marine Division
2d MARDIV 2d Marine Division 2d MAW 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
AC/S Assistant Chief of Staff
AGF Area Guard Force
AGF Area Guard Force ASF Auxiliary Security Force
AT/FP Antiterrorism/Force Protection
AT/FP Antiterrorism/Force Frotection
BOC Base Operations Center
C2 Command and Control
CamLej Camp Lejeune
CCMT Commander, Crisis Management Team
CCTV Closed Circuitry Television
CG Commanding General
CI Counterintelligence
CIB Combined Information Bureau
CID/MPI Criminal Investigations Division/Military Police
Investigator
CIDO Criminal Investigations Division Officer
CISMT Critical Incident Stress Management Team
CIT Counterintelligence Team
CM Consequence Management
CMT Crisis Management Team
CO Commanding Officer
COMPT Comptroller
COMSEC Communications Security
CPAO Consolidated Public Affairs Office
CPU Crime Prevention Unit (PMO)
C/S Chief of Staff
CT Counterterrorism
CTMF Commander, Threat Management Force
DoD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DON Department of the Navy
EMD Environment Management Division
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EVPS Electronic Vehicle Pass System
FAC Facilities
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Administration
GME Garrison Mobile Equipment
HAZMAT Hazardous Material
HRP High-Risk Personnel
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HqSptBn Headquarters Support Battalion (MCB)
ndah com

#### ACRONYMS

IAW In accordance with
ICAM Improved Chemical Agent Monitor
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IED Improvised Explosive Device
II MEF II Marine Expeditionary Force
IMINT Image Intelligence
INFOSEC Information Security
ISS Installation Security and Safety
IVA Installation Vulnerability Assessment
JPD Jacksonville Police Department
LOG Logistics
MANP Manpower
MCAS Marine Corps Air Station
MCB Marine Corps Base
MCCS Marine Corps Community Services
MCCSSS Marine Corps Combat Service Support School
MCES Marine Corps Engineer School
MCT Marine Combat Training (SOI)
MEVA Mission Essential Vulnerable Area
MHE Materiel Handling Equipment
MILCON Military Construction
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MP Military Police
MPI Military Police Investigator
MSD Management Support Department
NAVHOSP Naval Hospital
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCA National Command Authority
NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service
OCSD Onslow County Sheriff's Department
OIC Officer in Charge
OPORD Operation Order
OPSEC Operations Security
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PM Provost Marshal
PMO Provost Marshal's Office
POC Point of Contact
POM Program Objectivity Memorandum
PSE Personnel Support Equipment
PSE Physical Security Evaluation
RA/M Risk Assessment/Management
RAM Random Antiterrorism Measures
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SIGINT Signal Intelligence

#### ACRONYMS

SBI State (NC) Bureau of Investigations
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SOI School of Infantry
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SRT Special Reaction Team
TACON Tactical Control
TECHINT Technical Intelligence
TE&O Training, Education and Operations
TEVIB Training Equipment and Visual Information Branch
THREATCON Threat Conditions
TMF Threat Management Force
USCG United States Coast Guard
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
VIP Very Important Person
WAN Wide Area Network
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction